Is Rationality Normative?

@article{Broome2007IsRN,
  title={Is Rationality Normative?},
  author={John Broome},
  journal={Disputatio},
  year={2007},
  volume={2},
  pages={161 - 178},
  url={https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:171079649}
}
  • J. Broome
  • Published 1 November 2007
  • Philosophy
  • Disputatio
Abstract Rationality requires various things of you. For example, it requires you not to have contradictory beliefs, and to intend what you believe is a necessary means to an end that you intend. Suppose rationality requires you to F. Does this fact constitute a reason for you to F? Does it even follow from this fact that you have a reason to F? I examine these questions and reach a sceptical conclusion about them. I can find no satisfactory argument to show that either has the answer ‘yes’. I… 
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9 References

Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?1

Most of us take it for granted that we ought to be rational—to have the bundle of dispositions and abilities that constitute the faculty of rationality. Most of us also take it for granted that we…

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