European Economic Review

Social Norms: Enforcement, Breakdown & Polarization

Social Norms: Enforcement, Breakdown & Polarization
Guest Editors: Balafoutas, Dimant, Gächter & Krupka

Norms guide behavior in social and economic domains. They also help explain how self-serving tendencies are restrained in favor of engaging in behavior that is personally costly but socially beneficial, thus challenging the notion that individuals are exclusively guided by self-interest (Bernheim, 1994; Cialdini et al., 1990; Bicchieri, 2006; Goette et al., 2006; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016; Fehr and Schurtenberger, 2018; Bicchieri & Dimant, 2019; Bicchieri et al., 2022). The enforcement of norms is often crucial to sustain social order and such enforcement can come in various forms, such as monetary punishment or social ostracism through peers (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Masclet et al., 2003; Balafoutas & Nikiforakis, 2012; Balafoutas et al., 2014).

However, learning and enforcing social norms does not only have upsides. The recent rise in ideological and political polarization undermines the role of norms in promoting social cohesion and order. On the one hand, polarizing norms can lead to exclusion or conflict between groups of opposing views and even promote socially detrimental behaviors (recent examples including, among others, the spread of misinformation, opposition to vaccinations, and denial of climate change; see Akerlof & Kranton, 2008). On the other hand, the enforcement of norms becomes more difficult in polarized contexts, in which individuals do not share common values and goals or in which there may be group-specific norms to treat perceived outgroups poorly. (Herrmann et al., 2008; Gächter & Herrmann, 2011; Nikiforakis et al., 2012; Gelfand et al., 2022). The resulting negative externalities impose credible threats to democratic values, restrain social interactions across polarized clusters, as well as impede trust, altruism, and cooperativeness between polarized clusters (Van Bavel & Packer, 2021). These insights highlight the importance of understanding the dynamics of group identity when attempting to uphold, create new, or change existing social norms. Evidence suggests that the adherence to and enforcement of social norms varies cross-culturally (Gelfand et al., 2011; Gächter & Schulz, 2016), so to establish a comprehensive picture it is important to examine these questions across various domains.

In this special issue, we will bring together cutting-edge research from economics to illuminate and advance the scientific discourse around the enforcement, breakdown, and establishment of new norms and their relationship to polarization. Our objective is to cover a broad spectrum of methodological approaches, including theoretical, empirical, and experimental research at the individual, group, and cultural levels of analysis. We are particularly open to empirical research done with non-standard participants that help shed light on the broader implications and robustness of the findings across diverse populations, contexts, and cultures.

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